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This paper has been prepared as per the Memorandum of Cooperation “Analysis of the 
functioning and performance of EU integration structures in Kosovo” signed between 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Prishtina and the Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF). The 
contents of this report are the sole responsibility of KCSF and should under no 
circumstances reflect the position or views of FES Prishtina or its affiliated organizations. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Kosovo’s National Council for European Integration was established in 2012 to guide the 
country through the elaborate reforms required of it to move closer to EU.  After one year of 
operations, however, the Council is singularly failing to fulfil its mission.  
European integration retains the overwhelming support of the Kosovo populace, and is 
supported rhetorically by the entire Kosovar political spectrum. Yet KCSF’s research revealed 
that the Council set up to lead this process is divided, sidetracked by political exigencies, 
managed ineffectually, and opaque in its operations and communications. It is not held 
accountable for its shortcomings. And it operates largely out of the public eye.  
This paper—derived from months of research and interviews with key stakeholders—lays out 
relatively simple-to-enact recommendations aimed at transforming the Council from a hollow 
“talking-shop” into the competent, transparent and effective body that it was meant to be.  It 
also offers key suggestions to civil society organizations, the media and EU bodies to help bring 
about these changes.  
Foremost, KCSF calls upon the Council to focus on setting strategic directions and then building 
consensus around that vision. It insists that a system for monitoring the work of the Council be 
enacted to gauge whether it follows through on its own proclamations and promises. It 
demands that the Council respect its own Rules of Procedures when formulating meetings, 
distributing minutes and conclusions, and communicating with the public.  And that the Council 
open the entirety of its meetings to the media so that the Kosovar public can be kept informed 
of the Council’s work and hold it more accountable. 
The Council has already squandered its first year. If it is ever to play a meaningful role in 
furthering Kosovo’s EU integration agenda it must take immediate steps to improve its 
operations. It is now up to the Government, opposition parties, civil society and the media to 
pressure the Council into rising to this challenge.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The National Council for European Integration (hereinafter – the Council) has not delivered on 
its expectations during its first year of operation. Despite being charged as the institution 
responsible for uniting political forces to advance European integration—a broadly popular goal 
across Kosovar society—the Council has been divided, and its work has been non-transparent 
and ineffectual.  
KCSF’s research and analysis has led it to the conclusion that the Council should continue to 
exist if, and only if, it takes serious measures to improve its performance. If it continues to 
operate as it has done to date, it runs the risk of diluting the pace of needed reforms, as 
politicians use the Council for “political runway.”1   
This paper highlights an array of problems with the Council and proposes ways to improve its 
functioning. This inquiry tries to answer the following three questions:  
1) Has the Council succeeded in building national consensus over the European integration 
agenda?  
2) Has the Council succeeded at what it was established to do?  
3) Has the Council been transparent in its communication with the public? 
Finally, the paper also considers whether civil society 
has been able to contribute effectively to the Council’s 
operations.  
This paper has been articulated to speak to those 
audiences that have a decided interest in and leverage 
over Kosovo’s European integration process, including 
members of the Council itself, the Government of 
Kosovo, the Kosovo Assembly, the European 
Commission, EU affairs experts in Kosovo, and those 
civic groups interested in Kosovo’s EU-integration 
process.  
 
At the same time, KCSF aims to share these findings with the media and wider public with the 
aim of creating as broad a platform as possible to hold the Council more accountable, and to 
put pressure on those responsible for its shortcomings.  
This report contains a set of clear recommendations to improve how the Council functions. 
These recommendations seek to help the council transform its political rhetoric about 
European integration into tangible reforms. It is high time the Council start playing a 
meaningful role in this process. Otherwise, it must be held accountable for its failures. 
                                                          
1 Interview with Luan Shllaku, July 26, 2013 
 
“The paper intends to 
spotlight the deficiencies of 
the Council so that interested 
parties can fashion oversight 
and advocacy responses to 
improve the overall 
performance of the Council.” 
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2. Overview of the aims and functions of the Council  
 
The National Council for European Integration is Kosovo’s highest-level political coordination 
body dedicated to European Integration. Established in March 2012, it is chaired by the 
President of Kosovo and brings together the highest ranking representatives of the 
Government, the National Assembly, those political parties represented in the Assembly, the 
Judiciary, the Association of municipalities, civil society, trade unions and academia. The Council 
is mandated to ensure Kosovo’s clear and consistent course towards EU membership, 
irrespective of the potential changes in party politics within the Government and the Assembly.  
The Council, as per its Rules of Procedure2, should meet twice a year and provide strategic 
direction for the European integration process. To date, the Council has met four times.3 The 
Council is entrusted with coordinating the positions of multiple institutions and recommending 
actions to advance the European integration process. Specifically, it is mandated to: 
 Define the strategic orientation of the European integration process for the Republic 
of Kosovo; 
 Coordinate and harmonize the positions of institutions, political parties and civil 
society in the European integration process, with the aim of securing institutional, 
political and social support for the implementation of reforms; 
 Monitor Kosovo’s progress towards integration into the European Union; and  
 Provide recommendations for European integration process including also for 
negotiations with European Commission and EU member states. 
In practice, one of the Council’s crucial failures has been to focus on the overall strategic 
orientation of Kosovo’s EU path. The Council mandated the Ministry of European Integration to 
establish a Task Force for European Integration (TFEI)4 to produce the National Strategy for 
European Integration.5 This Strategy was expected to be discussed and approved by the 
Council. However, that discussion never took place; instead the Council focused predominantly 
on “topics-of-the-day”, failing to define any strategic orientation for Kosovo’s EU perspective.  
 
                                                          
2 Rules of Procedure establishing the Council http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=1,129  
3 See Table 1 
4 The Task Force is co-chaired by Vlora Çitaku, Minister of European Integration, and Lutfi Haziri, Head of the Assembly Committee on 
European Integration. Participatory discussions were organised in seven Thematic Round  Tables mirroring the thematic division of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue. The overall objective of the Task Force was to develop a draft National Strategy for 
European Integration while further developing consensus among major stakeholders and setting out recommendations for the 
Government of Kosovo. 
5 The draft strategy was presented to the President of Kosovo on  June 22, 2013. 
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2.1 Consensus Building 
 
In Kosovo, party politics and political interests trump the overall political commitment to join 
the European Union. Representatives of the EU are therefore particularly keen for the Council 
to function effectively so as to keep EU aspirations high on the political agenda. For this reason, 
EU representatives frequently use the Council as a forum to convey their message that daily 
politics should not subvert the EU integration process. For this to be viable, consensus-building 
on the issues surrounding European integration is vital. 
The creation of the Council in Kosovo, as in the other 
countries in the region with EU aspirations6, is 
intended to do exactly that: To determine the 
strategic direction for the European integration 
process and to coordinate and harmonize the 
positions of institutions, political parties and civil 
society in the process of European integration in order to muster the institutional support 
necessary to implement the required political and social reforms. The Council is expected to be 
the highest political level body that builds consensus when vis–à–vis the EU agenda.  
In Kosovo there is broad political and social consensus on Kosovo’s EU future. Yet political 
struggles outside of the Council affected the Council’s ability to bring on board all opposition 
leaders.7  
Opposition movement Vetëvendosje has always declared itself in support of Kosovo’s future in 
the EU; nevertheless it has refused to take part in the Council, arguing that its creation was 
unnecessary when national consensus on the EU integration process already existed in the 
Kosovo Assembly. Vetëvendosje has generally been against the creation of new governmental 
bodies and institutions. It contends that existing institutions should perform better rather than 
new ones being created. For that reason the leader of Vetëvendosje has thus far refused to 
participate in the Council. At its inaugural meeting the Rules of Procedure were changed 
precisely for this reason. The invitation was re-formulated to invite Vetëvendosje’s leader in his 
capacity as head of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and not as a leader of the political 
movement within the Assembly.8 Even so, the leader of Vetëvendosje never participated in 
Council meetings, undermining the Council’s ability to successfully unite all of Kosovo’s political 
parties in the Assembly. Furthermore, due to political struggles within the office of the 
President, the LDK party boycotted the first Council meeting and only re-joined after its second 
meeting. 
Despite doubts from some of the opposition parties, the Government contends that the 
creation of the Council was necessary and does not duplicate the work of the Assembly or the 
                                                          
6 These examples are taken from respective Councils in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia. 
7 Not all opposition parties are represented in the Council. These opposition leaders already have consensus in other institutions on the 
topic of EU integration, namely VV and LDK. 
8 The Head of the Committee for Foreign Affairs is Albin Kurti, leader of Vetëvendosje. 
Political struggles outside of the 
Council resulted in the failure to 
bring on board all opposition 
leaders. 
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Government. In its opinion, the Council should serve as a group of ‘wise-men’9 where 
irrespective of which party is in power, the European agenda would be kept at the highest level 
and that gaps in information surrounding EU reforms and between institutions and public 
opinion would decrease. 
Conversely, the opposition is convinced that the 
creation of the Council is useless and unnecessary. It 
argues that rhetorical consensus for EU integration 
already exists and that the Council has no executive 
power to seek accountability if its members are 
themselves responsible for the reforms. If responsible 
institutions deliver on their reforms, the Assembly of 
Kosovo is sufficient to ensure accountability, thus 
obviating the need for the Council.  Safet Gerxhaliu, a member of the Council even went as far 
as saying, “Every country intending to evade serious work and problem solving establishes 
trade unions and Councils”.10  
Civil society representatives are of the opinion that the non participation reflects the Council’s 
lack of efficacy. If the Council functioned well and proved its utility, it would attract a greater 
following and consensus.11 The opposition hesitates to cooperate in the Council, fearing that 
the body is perceived to serve the sole interests of the Government as opposed to the views of 
all political and societal layers of the country regarding EU affairs.12  
Given its current composition, achieving consensus within the Council is straightforward. Lack 
of informed and substantive discussions make it even easier to agree on broad lines of support 
for the European integration process.13 In this context there is always great enthusiasm for the 
European Union, but a lack of understanding about what the integration process actually 
entails.  
There is also confusion as to the roles and expectations of the Council. The Government 
representatives are of the opinion that the Council should offer broad guidelines and 
promulgate recommendations whereas the opposition parties and members of civil society 
argue that Council should be more active in spearheading specific reforms, seeking 
accountability and giving clear strategic orientations in the process.  
The Council should set strategic directions as it is the practice in other countries of the region. 
In Serbia and Macedonia, for instance, the Council closely monitors the implementation of the 
EU Integration strategies as well as proposes concrete guidelines for improving the EU 
accession process. In Serbia the Council is led by the Prime Minister/Government, and in 
Macedonia the Parliament leads the Council. Kosovo is the only country in the region where the 
Council is led by the President. Government officials suggested the role of the President here 
makes sense, given that the President should symbolize national unity in the EU process.  
                                                          
9 Interview with Besnik Vasolli, June 4, 2013 
10 Interview with Safet Gërxhaliu, June 7, 2013 
11 Interview with Valdete Idrizi, June 4, 2013 
12 Ibid 
13 Interview with Demush Shasha, June 7, 2013 
“There is great enthusiasm for the 
European Union, but a lack of 
understanding about what the EU-
integration process actually 
entails” 
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However, the weak political position of the President is reflected in the performance and work 
of the Council. Hence this body has been used to support the political marketing of the 
President, while the agenda is very much driven by the government. The majority of 
interviewees argued that the Council was established to increase the relevance and 
performance of the Office of the President as well as 
to push forward the Government’s EU agenda under a 
different header. The officials at the Presidency point 
out that the President is very active in promoting EU 
integration agenda for Kosovo.14  
The Council has not proven inclusive or effective. This missed opportunity results in a lack of 
interest among members to participate as they believe nothing can be achieved through the 
Council apart from routine exchanges of information. They believe the Council has amounted to 
little more than a political talk-shop and that other bodies and institutions can more effectively 
address the tasks of the Council. Mimoza Gojani stressed that, “If used to its full potential, it 
can make a meaningful contribution to Kosovo’s 
European integration efforts”.15  Yet the Council can 
easily become useless if its work is diluted and results 
in hollow political statements. 
Ultimately, all parties agree that actions need to be taken in order to improve the work of the 
Council and to achieve all-inclusive participation and consensus. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Interview with Adrian Prenkaj, June 5, 2013 
15 Interview with Mimoza Gojani, June 7, 2013 
“The agenda is very much driven by 
the Government.” 
“The Council has resulted in a 
political talk-shop.” 
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2.2 Consistency and Content 
National Council meetings lack sufficient preparation and consistent agenda. Meetings are 
scheduled on short notice or cancelled/postponed several times, they lack consistence, they are 
poorly prepared in terms of their content and they have the tendency to serve daily politics. All 
of the respondents—apart from the Council secretariat staff16—agreed that poorly prepared 
meetings, weak content and a lack of consistency undermine the Council’s functioning. 
Instead of setting strategic priorities, Council meetings tend 
to deal with other topics that Government prioritizes at the 
time of each meeting. The Government representatives 
KCSF interviewed stated that this was an inevitable reality, 
as it often had to react to the main issues being discussed 
with the EU at any given moment. 
The Council is supposed to meet twice a year and provide strategic directions for the European 
integration process. Instead, as depicted in the table below, it met every 4 months and 
addressed ad-hoc issues responding to political impetus and developments. 
  Table 1: Council Meetings 
 
                                                          
16 Interview with Adrian Prenkaj, June 5, 2013 
 NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
     
No of 
Meeting 
Invitations Sent Date of 
Meeting 
Agenda Meeting Minutes/ 
Conclusions 
I. 22 March, 2013 
(2 working days 
before) 
27 March, 
2012 
Inauguration,  
RoP Adopted 
Feasibility Study 
Structure Presented 
Not Available 
Only conclusions posted 
online 
II. 22 June, 2012 
(5 working days 
before) 
3 July, 
2012 
Visa Liberalization 
Process 
Meeting Minutes 
distributed after two 
months 
III. Twice postponed 
Last invitation sent 
one day before the 
meeting 
12 December, 
2012 
Feasibility Study for 
Kosovo 
Draft Meeting Minutes 
shared on 26 December, 
2013. Final meeting 
minutes never shared. 
IV 13 March, 2013 
(3 working days 
before) 
19 March, 
2013 
European Agenda in 
general – consensus 
building 
Draft Meeting Minutes 
shared on 26 April, 2013. 
Final Meeting minutes 
never shared. 
“National Council meetings 
lack sufficient preparations 
and consistent agenda.” 
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Invitations: The Council’s Rules of Procedure mandate that Council meetings be announced at 
least 10 working days prior to taking place. At that point Council members should be invited to 
propose agenda items. In reality, however, Council meetings have been announced only 2-5 
days before taking place (see Table 1). In the case of the third meeting, due to cancellations and 
postponements, the last invitation for civil society members arrived only one day before the 
meeting. This causes difficulties for members to prepare for the Council meetings, in particular 
those representing larger platforms. For example, Valdete Idrizi participates on behalf of the 
CIVIKOS Platform17 which represents more than 140 organizations. In order to properly inform 
the members of her platform and garner their feedback and input the invitation should have 
reached her at least 10 working days prior to the meeting, as per the Council’s Rules of 
Procedure. The interviews also revealed that that the distribution of Council documents was 
not uniform: Representatives from some opposition parties received their dockets on time 
while civil society members received them with significant delay.18 
This above-described work practices, deliberate or not, undermine the morale of the Council’s 
members. Moreover, members have insufficient time to prepare or propose agenda items. It is 
no surprise the Council meetings are devoid of much substance. 
Council meetings are also convened to accommodate requests from senior EU officials, namely 
the EU Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Stefan Füle. During his visit to 
Kosovo in March 2013 Commissioner Füle asked to be present at the Council meeting to jointly 
address everyone on the progress of Kosovo’s EU integration agenda.19 For this reason the 
Fourth Council meeting convened hastily. With only three day’s notice, the meeting was not 
attended by civil society representatives. 
Agenda Setting: Another practice of the Council is to set agendas which react to burning 
political issues in EU-Kosovo relations. The introduction of the Visa Roadmap and an EC 
Feasibility Study occupied agenda items almost at every meeting. This approach runs contrary 
to the Council’s mission, which should be to propose concrete guidelines for improving the EU 
accession process and to review commitments made in previous meetings and assess progress 
in their implementation. 
However, this study has found that that there is no strategic vision on the EU integration 
process offered by the Council. Moreover, the Council lacks linkage between its own 
commitments i.e. Council Recommendations and its subsequent Council Agenda topics. For 
instance, at the Council’s second meeting it requested all responsible institutions to design 
action plans concerning the requirements for the Visa Liberalization roadmap. These plans were 
never prepared or presented to Council members for review or to indeed verify they had been 
drafted. Instead, the third meeting agenda was replaced with another subject, the EC Feasibility 
Study and its short-term requirements. In the meantime, the Ministry of European Integration 
(MEI) prepared the Action Plan for Visa Liberalization but this document never reached the 
                                                          
17 For more visit www.civikos.net  
18 Interview with Burim Ramadani, June 20, 2013 and Valdete Idrizi, June 4, 2013. 
19 Interview with Adrian Prenkaj, June 5, 2013 
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Council—neither for comment nor for informational purposes.20 Later, this document was 
posted on the MEI’s website.  
Council Recommendations from the second meeting held 3 July, 2012, requested authorities to 
focus on visa roadmap requirements on public order and security, namely fighting organized 
crime and corruption. Secondly, they recommended the coordination of institutions on the rule 
of law for appropriate implementation and budgeting. They urged the rule of law to be 
supported with appropriate administrative and human resources. Follow-up on these 
recommendations has never taken place. This total disconnection between Council meetings 
and Council Recommendations relegates Council meetings and outcomes to mere political 
rhetoric.  
Meeting Minutes and Conclusions: Another poor 
practice in the way the Council functions is how it 
handles meeting minutes and conclusions. As noted 
in Table 1, the minutes from the inaugural meeting 
have never been made public.  The Conclusions of 
that meeting were only posted online after KCSF, 
through its member, lobbied for them to be made public. The meeting minutes and conclusions 
for the 3 July, 2012 meeting were only distributed in mid September—after a delay of more 
than two months! Such delays undermine everyone’s ability to monitor whether the Council’s 
Conclusions have been respected. After the third meeting this matter was raised by civil society 
representatives. They submitted a formal letter21 to the Council secretariat but the impact was 
minimal. After the third and fourth meetings it still took five weeks for the Council to share the 
minutes with its members.  
After civil society’s letter of complaint to the Council secretariat, the secretariat distributed 
draft minutes offering the possibility for members to provide comments. Jointly with the 
CIVIKOS platform KCSF submitted comments and revisions to the minutes of the third meeting 
but never got an official response as to whether its suggestions were taken into consideration. 
Finally, subsequent to the last two meetings the members received only draft minutes and 
conclusions. Indeed, the National Council never sent final minutes and conclusions to its 
members.22  
Several members of the Council agree that these unprofessional practices undermine the 
reputation and credibility of the Council. They are also convinced that the meetings amount to 
little more than photo ops. To buttress this claim, they note that after the media cameras exit, 
more than half of the Council members exit as well. As a result, discussion topics are treated 
superficially, as motivation in the Council dips once its members trickle out. 
The Council lacks mechanisms and structures to monitor the implementation of its decisions 
and to seek accountability. For example in its inaugural meeting the Council mandated a Task 
Force on European Integration to prepare a diagnostic report on the National Strategy for 
                                                          
20 Interview with Burim Ramadani, June 20, 2013 
21 Letter sent to National Council for European Integration by its Civil Society members Fatmir Curri (KCSF) and Valdete Idrizi (CIVIKOS) 
dated December 17, 2012 
22 Interview with Adrian Prenkaj, June 5, 2013  
“Technical deficiencies undermine 
the reputation of the Council, while 
meetings end up being little more 
than photo ops.” 
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European Integration. It was intended that this report would be discussed at the autumn 2012 
Council meeting. However, the report was never tabled, nor have the Council members ever 
seen it. Paradoxically, the draft version of the Strategy was shared in late June 2013 along with 
the invitation to fifth meeting. That invitation arrived one working day before the meeting was 
set to take place.23 Aside from being 9 days late, it was utterly impossible for Council members 
to digest the attached Strategy— a voluminous document covering a wide range of sectors and 
themes.  For unknown reasons, this meeting was ultimately postponed. 
 
2.3 Transparency and Communication 
 
The National Council for European Integration is not 
transparent in its actions and fails to effectively keep 
Kosovo’s public informed. Several considerations 
support this argument, including: the composition and 
format of the meetings, the lack of timely and public 
conclusions and minutes, the absence of press 
releases after each meeting, the paucity of 
information on the Council’s website, the unavailability of a public list of Council members, and 
the absence of contact information for the Council Secretariat itself. 
Meeting composition and format: The composition of the Council does not cover the entire 
spectrum of Kosovo society. In other countries in the region, i.e. Macedonia and Serbia, similar 
forums include participants from academia, media associations, trade unions, religious leaders 
of all denominations, as well as renowned individuals whose contribution is valuable to the EU 
process. In neither case does the National Council in neighbouring countries invite the Head of 
the EU Office to the National Council meetings, nor other ambassadors from EU Members or 
other countries. The reason for this is simple: the Councils were established to serve as 
“National” Councils on European Integration. The Head of the European Union Office in Kosovo 
(EUOK) is perfectly well-intentioned in wanting to contribute to these meetings. However, his 
presence should be curtailed, to ensure the Council remains a national institution fully 
accountable to national actors. 
Council gatherings are divided into two parts: the first part is open to the media, while the 
second part is held behind closed doors. Council conclusions are posted online whereas 
meeting minutes are only available to members. Hence, many issues of major public interest 
are kept away from wider audiences. Some government officials’ stress that opening the 
second part to the media would be counterproductive since members will hesitate to openly 
discuss their ideas in front of cameras. On this point, KCSF believes that opening the Council 
meetings to the public would improve public trust in the work of the Council and increase the 
accountability of its members.  
                                                          
23 Invitations were sent by the Council on June 20, (Thursday) for the 5th Council meeting planned for June 22, 2012 (Saturday). 
“The National Council for European 
Integration is deficient in its 
transparency and communication 
with the Kosovo public.” 
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The Council has failed to present a balanced picture to the public by dint of excluding the media 
from the second portion of the meetings where civic groups, trade unions and other non-
governmental actors finally have the opportunity to weigh in on the discussions (the first 
portion of the meeting only features remarks from political actors).  One member of the Council 
lamented that, “it is useless to listen to the same speeches over and over confirming the 
political will for European integration. There is huge need for real reforms to be discussed such 
as rule of law, the quality of laws and their implementation, and their impact on economic 
development.”24 
Communication with the public is non-existent. Except for airing the first part of Council 
meetings live on TV and posting the politicians’ prepared remarks online, the public is not kept 
informed about Council proceedings, activities, decisions and performance. The Council 
documents are not made available to the public and sometimes are not even made available to 
its members.25 On this matter a civil society representative notes that even for him, “as an avid 
follower of politics and European integration matters, 
the work of the Council is unclear. One can only 
imagine what an ordinary citizen would know about 
the Council”.26  Another member of the Council, 
Burim Ramadani from AAK, stated that “We expected 
an exchange of information about the work of the 
Task Force for European Integration. We as an opposition party wanted to be informed about 
the progress of this task force. We wanted to know what the diagnosis is and what strategic 
orientations we are setting. None of this was reported to us as members of the Council. We 
needed to gather this information on our own through various channels, including the 
Assembly of Kosovo”. Valdete Idrizi, a civil society representative on the Council commented: “I 
didn’t expect miracles from the Council, I didn’t have high expectations, but at least I expected 
that the Council would share its documents and be more open with its members and the 
audience”.27 
The Council also lacks administrative capacity to properly handle communications. For instance:  
The Council only makes public its Conclusions while meeting minutes are not made public.28 
KCSF helped to prepare the initial draft of Rules of Procedure for the Council and proposed that 
meeting minutes should be fully available to the public. This is the norm with similar Councils in 
the region.  Unfortunately, this proposal was changed when the final Rules of Procedure were 
approved. Making the minutes public would increase confidence in the public and improve the 
accountability of Council members. Additionally, it would provide a useful platform for civic 
groups to monitor the work of the Council against the decisions it takes.  
 
                                                          
24 Interview with Safet Gërxhaliu, June 7, 2013 
25 Interview with Burim Ramadani, June 20, 2013 
26 Observation from the focus group with CSOs, June 19, 2013 
27 Interview with Valdete Idrizi, June 4, 2013 
28 Article 8.2 of the Rules of Procedure available at http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=1,129 
“Issues of major public interest 
have been kept out of public 
debate and closed for the media.” 
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The Council’s website fails to provide information about the names of its members and their 
contact details. It even omits the contact information of its own Secretariat.29 An awkward 
situation arose when media prepared a story about the Council and its cooperation with civil 
society and none of the current Council members were interviewed. Making matters worse, 
people with little or nothing to do with the Council were interviewed for this subject. The 
media’s justification was that they were unaware of who sat on the Council.  Indeed, the 
Council’s website30 doesn’t provide the names, responsibilities or contact information of its 
own secretariat31 making it especially difficult for anyone to contact it to request information. 
Having a transparent Council is a vital prerequisite for an open, effective and well-considered 
European integration process. Therefore, this Council needs to take urgent steps to improve its 
transparency and communications. 
3. Cooperation with civil society 
 
Civil society has not offered its finest contribution to the Council. Thus it is important to analyze 
civil society’s role and input in the Council.  Cooperation between government and civil society 
is important in pushing forward the EU agenda. As such, the Council should be commended for 
including civil society in its composition from the beginning of the process. This practice could 
serve as a benchmark to foster structured cooperation between civil society and government in 
other spheres.  
The proactive participation of civil society in the 
Council is not a choice but a must if we are striving 
towards democratic, all-inclusive and transparent EU 
processes. Once civil society is brought in as a constituent member of the Council it should 
engage with government and other stakeholders constructively. 
The Council’s Rules of Procedure provide an avenue for CSO representatives to be 
regular/equal members in the Council. The rules do not specify a limitation in numbers, though 
currently the Council has five members representing civil society.32  
Initially KCSF supported the Council to design the Rules of Procedure, including the documents 
regulating civil society participation in the Council.33 KCSF recommended that four participants 
from civil society and two from the media become members of the Council. These four would 
cover the European integration process in general and each of the Copenhagen criteria. 
However, the final version of these provisions excluded the media and did not cap the number 
of CSO representatives.  
 
                                                          
29  The link http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=1,129 provides only categories of institutions. 
30 http://www.president-ksgov.net/?page=1,129 
31 As of September 18, 2013 the contact details are still missing from Council’s website. 
32 The regular members are representative of the CIVIKOS Platform Valdete Idrizi – Executive Director and Kosovar Civil Society 
Foundation (KCSF) representative  Fatmir Curri – Director of European integration programme whereas representative of Kosovo 
Foundation for Open Society (KFOS) Luan Shllaku – Executive Director has never participated. The Council also has members from 
Kosovo Chamber of Commerce (OEK) 32 and the Association of Kosovo Municipalities (AKK)32. 
33 KCSF has prepared first drafts of the: Call for Nominations, Selection Criteria, and Application Form. 
“Civil society did not give its finest 
contribution to the Council.” 
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Although the Call for Nominations was available for 
CSOs to nominate their representatives for the 
Council, only a limited number of applications were 
received. The Council had to re-launch the call and 
directly encourage various representatives to join. 
When asked why the CSO representatives did not actively seek membership on the Council they 
pointed out the limited impact such bodies tend to have in Kosovo and the perceived legitimacy 
they would lend to the Government by taking part in this process. Others pointed out that they 
critically monitor the work of the institutions in the EU process so playing a formal role within 
these bodies would inherently limit their independence.34  
 
All of the above-mentioned arguments point to a deeply sceptical civil society that has lost faith 
in its own capacity to bring about changes in the strategic orientation of Kosovo. If this trend of 
non-interest in participation persists it undercuts the ability for civil society to complain about 
the functioning of Councils, bodies and other institutions where the government has invited it 
to participate but it declined. Membership of civil society in the Council should be taken as a 
serious responsibility by all members from this sector. 
 
A dedicated and empowered civil society can play an 
important role in ensuring that EU principles are 
upheld in practice by the Council. It is also in itself a 
crucial component of any democracy. By articulating 
citizens' concerns, civil society organisations are active 
in the public arena and engage in initiatives which 
foster pluralism and participatory democracy.35 To be sure, the EU has regularly criticized the 
lack of civil society inclusion in policy planning in Kosovo.36 The culture of inclusion and 
cooperation between public institutions and civil society needs to be improved. The Council 
provides a reasonable structure for this to take place. Hence, neither the Council nor civil 
society should waste this opportunity. 
 
On the other hand civil society should not expect its inclusion in the Council to be an end in 
itself. Civil society has challenged the Council on procedural improvements related to timely 
invitations, and its distribution of minutes and conclusions. However, it should also 
demonstrate a proactive approach when it comes to defying the lack of substance in Councils’ 
meetings. Otherwise it risks serving as yet another complacent actor in the Council’s weak 
output and performance. This should change immediately. One cannot expect to have a strong 
Council without the engaged voice of civil society within the Council.  After all, it is easy to 
criticize and complain from the outside but once CSO are part of the formal mechanism they 
need to demonstrate serious dedication and commitment.   
                                                          
34 Observation from the focus group with CSOs, June 19, 2013 
35 Guidelines for EU support to civil society in enlargement countries, 2014-2020. DG Enlargement 
36 EC Progress reports for Kosovo 2009, 2010 and 2011. 
“One cannot expect to have a strong 
Council without the strong voice of 
civil society actors in the Council.” 
“An empowered civil society can 
play an important role in ensuring 
that EU principles are upheld in 
practice.” 
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4. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The National Council has failed to bring on board all opposition leaders. The Council meetings 
lack sufficient preparations. Meetings are scheduled on short notice, lack consistence, are weak 
in content and have a tendency to serve daily politics rather than a strategic vision. Most of this 
has been kept out of the public eye by being closed off to media.  
These factors have reduced the interest and enthusiasm of the Council members, many of 
whom are not convinced that strategic direction can be spearheaded by the Council. This reality 
does not provide fodder for civil society’s contribution, involvement and monitoring of the 
European integration process in Kosovo. 
The Council should build consensus and be a generator of reforms. It should set priorities and 
monitor the implementation of interventions to address those priorities. Failure to address the 
above-mentioned problems will ensure the Council remains a forum for covering up delays and 
justifying inaction.  
KCSF will continue to monitor the work of the Council with a determination as to whether the 
Council has improved or not and what steps should be taken further. In the meantime, in order 
to break this cycle of ineptitude and dysfunction, KCSF has constructed the below list of 
recommendations that all Council stakeholders should react to.  
 
To the National Council for European Integration: 
 Set strategic directions for Kosovo within the European integration agenda and build 
consensus around that vision. 
 Establish a system for monitoring the work of the Council, in particular against its own 
stated conclusions/recommendations. 
 Revise the Rules of Procedure to make Council meetings fully public by opening the 
second part of Council meetings to the media.  
 Respect the Rules of Procedure when preparing meetings, especially with regards to the 
timely dissemination of invitations and agenda setting. 
 Strengthen administrative and human resources handling the work of the Council. In 
particular, the PR and communications of the Council need to be overhauled so that 
Press Releases and other germane information is made public after each meeting and so 
that the Council’s website includes, among other things, the names, functions and 
contact information of all those on and affiliated with the Council. 
 
To the Government:  
 Focus on implementing strategic directions set by the Council. 
 Bring to discussion and adopt the National Strategy on European Integration as a key 
strategic document to guide Kosovo on its EU path. 
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 Treat the Council as highest institutional body where consensus and positions are built 
to support the EU integration path of Kosovo.  
 Prepare and share relevant reports with all Council members in order to improve the 
Council’s output and performance. 
 
To the European Commission/EU Office in Kosovo: 
 Participate more selectively in Council meetings. Its representative it need not 
participate in every meeting of the Council. This is a National Council and not an arena 
for legitimizing every statement made by high political elites in Kosovo. 
 Closely monitor the work of the Council against the specific commitments it makes.  
 Advocate for all Council meetings, minutes and recommendations to be made fully 
public. 
To opposition parties: 
 Act as a constructive opposition: lay out your views as to how the EU integration process 
should be conducted. 
 Demand accountability and transparency with regards to the reforms. Demand that 
Council Conclusions be reviewed regularly to take stock of progress and hold 
accountable those who do not perform against the decisions taken by the Council. 
 Offer constructive alternatives and propose solutions for key reforms being discussed.  
To civil society: 
 Proactively prod the Council to function as it was intended to. Regularly offer 
constructive advice and suggestions to the Council to improve its operations.  
 Bring public concerns about the European integration process and/or the functioning of 
the Council to the attention of the full Council membership. Consult and gather inputs 
from a wide spectrum of civil society organizations. 
 Work to ensure that Council discussions are substantive and that consensus for reforms 
is built.  Use the media to transmit developments in the EU agenda to keep the public 
informed. 
 To media: 
 Seek access to Council meetings and conclusions and follow up with stories – especially 
those that put pressure on officials to be held accountable to their promises and 
responsibilities. 
 Analyze key documents concerning the EU agenda to get informed about the Council 
meetings and its proceedings. 
 Contact Council members for input and feedback prior to airing stories about the work 
of the Council. 
 Keep the public abreast of all developments—positive and negative—related to the EU 
integration process so as to galvanize general support for the upcoming phases of 
reforms.  
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ANNEXES  
 Annex I –Methodology 
 
This study was formulated by conducting: 
1) Desk research, with a particular focus on the documents produced by the Council itself 
i.e., Rules of Procedure, composition, invitations, agendas, meeting minutes and 
conclusions/recommendations.37  
2) Qualitative, semi-structured interviews with Council members and key stakeholders 
(representing Government, EU Embassies, opposition parties, the European Commission 
Liaison Office in Kosovo, municipality representatives, and trade unions and civil society. 
See Annex II for a complete list of those interviewed  
3) Focus group sessions, organized with civil society representatives to review their 
assessment on the work of the Council and to better understand the relationship 
between the Council and civic groups. Focus groups were also used to assess and 
confirm the validity of the main findings of the interviews.  
.  
                                                          
37 The terms “Conclusions” and “Recommendations” are both used here because the Council secretariat initially called them Conclusions. 
After the second Council meeting they began to be written as Proposals and by the third Council meeting they were called draft 
Recommendations. 
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Annex II – List of Interviewees 
 
No Name and Surname Organization/Position Date 
1 Sazan Ibrahimi NCEI member 
Association of Kosovo Municipalities,  
Executive Director 
May 27, 2013 
2 Besnik Vasolli Ministry of European Integration, 
Adviser to the Minister 
June 4, 2013 
3 Valdete Idrizi NCEI Member  
CIVIKOS Platform, Executive Director 
June 4, 2013 
4 Alma Lama Assembly of Kosova, Member of 
Committee on European 
Integration, Independent Member 
June 4, 2013 
5 Adrian Prenkaj Office of the President of Kosovo, 
adviser to the President, NCEI 
Secretariat 
June 5, 2013 
6 Lutfi Haziri NCEI Member 
Assembly of Kosova, Head of 
Committee on European 
Integration, LDK 
June 6, 2013 
7 Mimoza Gojani UK Embassy, EU Officer June 7, 2013 
8 Safet Gërxhaliu NCEI Member 
Kosovo Chamber of Commerce 
June 7, 2013 
9 Demush Shasha Ministry of European Integration, 
Secretary General 
June 7, 2013 
10 Patrick SCHMELZER EU Office in Kosovo, Policy Officer June 19, 2013 
11 Burim Ramadani NCEI Member 
Assembly of Kosova, AAK 
June 20, 2013 
12 Luan Shllaku NCEI Member 
KFOS, Executive Director 
  July 26, 2013 
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Focus Group  
1. Driton Selmanaj, KDI 
2. Shpend Emini, D4D 
3. Fisnik Korenica, GLPS 
4. Albana Merja, GLPS 
CSO representatives June 19, 2013 
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 Annex III – Questionnaire 
Key Questions: 
1) What are the NCEI expectations? 
2) Do you think there is a national consensus within NCEI and how can the council move forward 
the EI agenda? 
3) Based on your opinion was the establishment of NCEI really necessary? 
4) How much has NCEI achieved to communicate with the public? 
5) How transparent was the council with stakeholders? 
6) Do you believe that the work of the Council had: 
a. content,  
b. consistence,  
c. fulfilment of its own commitments and  
d. Respect of recommendations?  
A. Rules of procedure and establishment 
1) Do you have knowledge of similar bodies in the region? Where best practices taken into 
consideration? 
2) Was it necessary to establish a unit/secretariat within NCEI presidency? Was it required 
to establish units in other institutions to comply with NCEI work? 
3) Is there sufficient administrative capacity within NCEI to treat work load from the NCEI 
meeting? What are the qualifications of the staff? 
4) Who sets the agenda of the NCEI? 
5) Is there adequate staff for PR work? 
6) Is there delegated staff from MEI/other ministries to assist the work of NCEI? 
 
B.  Functioning and Performance of NCEI 
1) Has the consensus been achieved from the perspective of membership, content and positions to 
get to a joint national agenda for EI? If not, why? 
2) Are you satisfied with the rules of procedures? If not, why? 
3) Are RoP respected in practice? Specifically are articles such as composition, calling of meetings, 
preparations, meeting minutes, recommendations respected? 
4) Were you consulted on drafting and preparation for next Council meetings? 
5) Are meeting materials and reports being sent prior to meetings to members? How long before 
the meeting you receive the agenda, invitation and materials? 
6) Does the council as reporting from commitments/recommendation of previous meetings? 
7) Is there a link between recommendations from previous meeting and agenda of the next 
meeting? 
8) Are documents of the Council circulated to members? Are NCEI meetings open for 
media/public? Are NCEI documents open for media/public? 
 
C. Cooperation with Civil Society 
1) What is the role of CS in this process and in particular within this Council? 
2) Is there a process of consultations and inclusion of CS in the work of the NCEI? Are you satisfied 
with inclusiveness, representation and contribution from CS members? 
3) Are concerns and positions of civil society public? 
4) Are recommendations and issues raised from civil society members taken into consideration for 
next meetings? 
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